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IKE THE MASTER PUPPET MAKERS
of the classic folk tales, artificial
intelligence (AI) engineers have
built some marvelous machines.
The first 50 years of AI focused on
programming computers to perform
tasks that previously only humans
could do—tasks such as speech, dri-
ving, planning, problem solving, and
vacuuming. The principal challenges
have been to create suitable language
systems and inference engines and
then to more or less manually stuff
those with sufficient facts, heuristics,
and algorithms to perform well-
defined tasks.
However, the “puppets” remain
severely limited and brittle. They have
virtually no capability to explore the
world, experiment, learn from failure,
ingest knowledge from readily
available sources, expand and
improve their concepts, or con-
tinuously improve. They are
surely valuable; indeed, I call
them puppets not in a derogato-
ry sense but to respect the
importance of their program-
mers and builders, for the true
accomplishments were theirs.
However, our puppetry will not
leap across the chasm separating
us from a world of artificially
intelligent creatures.
LEAPING THE CHASM
To get there,  we need a
singularity of artificial neo-cre-
at ionism, where we launch
artificial beings into the world
that  can adapt ,  learn,  and
evolve themselves. (I use the
term neo-creationism to mean
an intentional effort to popu-
late the world with intelligent
entities initially engineered by
humans. The biblical story of
Genesis, the heart of creation-
ism, provides an apt foil for
understanding the goals and
scope of the R&D program
advocated here.) To reach the
goal reasonably quickly, we
should equip these creatures
with as much capability and
knowledge as possible. Most of
all, we need to assure they can
learn from experience and
demonstrate continuous improve-
ment over an increasing array of
tasks and settings.
The field of AI began with an
enthusiastic embrace of newly avail-
able computing machinery and a
basic question: What kinds of prob-
lems can we solve? Then AI engi-
neers made comparisons between
humans and machines as problem
solvers, and the race was on to see
what kinds of problems could be
solved by machines, perhaps even
better than by humans. Solving
math word problems, gaining cham-
pionships in checkers and chess,
understanding natural language, and
generating plans and schedules
reinforced our efforts to build
supercapable machines.
From time to time, many of us in
the field have recognized the factors
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under various names and from various
viewpoints, such as  the knowledge
acquisition bottleneck, machine learn-
ing, bootstrapping systems, A-life, and
self-organizing systems. Some have
focused on efforts to create a large
body of off-the-shelf knowledge that
would enable the next puppet to stand
on the shoulders of its predecessors.
Mostly, however, these efforts have had
limited success. A little bit of learning
and adaptation has been demonstrated,
but it pales in comparison to the labori-
ous inputs of the puppeteers. We are, I
believe, on a local maximum, making
better and better puppets, with no
apparent increase in our speed. We’re
stuck, and puppet making is a technol-
ogy begging to be leapfrogged.
ANALYZING THE PROBLEM
The best systems of our times have
been mostly handcrafted by great engi-
neers. These puppet makers have ana-
lyzed the task environments, knowledge
requirements, and reasoning skills
required for successful applications and
have addressed them with better and bet-
ter tools over time. Any well-defined and
sufficiently narrow task could be con-
quered in this way. When the puppets
failed at some task, the engineers would
diagnose and debug the errors, deter-
mine what knowledge to add or modify,
how to program the knowledge, and
how to modify and rebalance the preex-
isting programs to accommodate the new
performance and avoid harming the pre-
viously correct ones. A very limited
amount of adaptation, learning, and
knowledge acquisition was automated,
but this was always a tiny fraction of the
overall knowledge, which was mostly
manually prepared.
We haven’t yet figured out how to
make the puppets responsible for their
own debugging and improvement. As a
consequence, we’re on a curve of dimin-
ishing returns, because improvements
are mostly labor intensive. Efforts to
address this productivity decline through
reusable knowledge bases have had lim-
ited success, however, for several rea-
sons. Chief among them is that the
human engineers are the ones who must
comprehend the problem, analyze the
knowledge requirements, determine
how to adapt the available knowledge to
the new application requirements, and
conduct the essentially experimental
cycle of modifying the implementation,
then testing, diagnosing, refining the
knowledge, and adapting the code.
So while the puppets get more mar-
velous, the credit goes to the pup-
peteers—not the puppets. Moreover,
the time intervals between significant
improvements aren’t decreasing. The
rate-limiting factor is the speed with
which human engineers can change the
puppets.
A VISION AND AN OPPORTUNITY
In the dome of the Vatican’s Sistine
Chapel in Rome, Michelangelo Buonar-
roti’s fresco shows the Creation of Adam.
The artist renders this biblical tale with a
pregnant touch between the hand of
God and the hand of Adam. Many inter-
pret this as illustrating the simultaneous
animating of Adam and the bestowal of
free will. In AI jargon, Adam was granted
autonomy and agency, as well as respon-
sibility. This is a bit of a conundrum for
an inexperienced, naïve, ignorant, or
merely inexpert creature. Given the lack
of knowledge and experience, such crea-
tures are bound to commit errors. If they
are to thrive, they certainly need to incor-
porate a strong drive to improve as well
as possess an effective process for con-
tinuous improvement.
Continuous improvement is widely
taken for granted as the essential foun-
dation for organizational excellence, but
we can be pretty sure a lot of this was
taken for granted in the biblical story of
creation. Nevertheless, the idea that cre-
ation would launch many sentient,
autonomous, continuously improving,
and responsible creatures suggests the
way forward for AI. If we want our pup-
pets to fulfill the potential of AI, we
need to launch a new category of critters
that have similar capabilities. Making
better and better clockwork puppets
won’t do it for us, because we simply
can’t evolve them fast enough. 
Many researchers have gone after this
idea by focusing on simple creatures that
could adapt and improve through rela-
tively simple, mechanistic evolutionary
techniques. They are making good
progress, albeit at a low point on the
evolutionary tree. Nevertheless, it seems
obvious that we should be launching
our evolutionary efforts on a much high-
er plane of understanding and sophisti-
cation, so that we can avoid the long
process of recreating the kind of human
knowledge the current engineers regu-
larly transfer into the puppets. I believe
the high-reward, low-risk approach is
rather straightforward: We should shift
most of our R&D to self-improving, high-
competence, knowledge-intensive systems.
We should launch an age of neo-cre-
ationism, borrowing from the story of
the creation of Adam, and focusing on




The kinds of critters we want are
those that can plan and act in the world
with continuously improving results.
These agents will base many decisions
on their beliefs about how the world
works, which I term their “world
model.” That model enables them to
interpret observations by instantiating
their parameterized models to match
the observations, that is, to perform
analysis by synthesis. Their world
model enables them to predict likely
outcomes of actions and dynamic
processes, by computing the implica-
tions of such hypothetical states of the
model. This ability allows the agents to
choose promising plans, by selecting
ones that lead to favorable predicted
outcomes. I call this entire cycle “effi-
cient thought,” illustrated in Fig. 1.
The eight steps are numbered in a
typical sequence, though in most com-
plex organizations all eight steps oper-
ate in parallel. The intelligent being:
1) observes what’s happening in the
environment
2) assesses the situation for signifi-
cant threats and opportunities
3) determines what changes would
be desirable
4) generates candidate plans for
making those changes
5) projects the likely outcomes of
those plans
6) selects the best plan
7) communicates that plans to key
parties and implements it
8) throughout, the intelligent being
validates and improves its model.
The model supports all eight activi-
ties, although only steps 1, 2, 7, and 8
directly update and modify the model. 
COMPARISON WITH GOOD
OLD-FASHIONED AI (GOFAI)
Planning has been a central focus of
AI for a long time, and yet planning has
proved difficult and brittle. In addition,
models have been a staple of computa-
tional methods for some time, so the spe-
cial properties of the world model in effi-
cient thought might not be obvious. Let’s
consider each of these issues in turn. 
Efficient thought views planning as a
vital element but not the only element
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that’s important. In contrast to conven-
tional AI, efficient thought emphasizes
continuous improvement in perfor-
mance. This requires a focus on learn-
ing what works and what doesn’t. That,
in turn, requires collecting data, notic-
ing when results violate expectations,
and generating conjectures to subject to
empirical testing.
This emphasis on learning empirically
what behaviors produce is what distin-
guishes efficient thought from GOFAI.
Traditional AI has mostly ignored the
problem of incorrect or incomplete mod-
els, reducing the engineering tasks to 1)
building adequate models and 2) apply-
ing those models in planning to achieve
specified goals mostly by “proof.” When
plans don’t actually succeed in GOFAI,
the failure reflects programmer
error, because the engineer
didn’t correctly incorporate
essential elements into the
knowledge base.
Knowledge engineer-




base that the infer-
ence engine uses to
solve problems the
program is trained to
address. When we
take the engineer out
of the improvement
loop, the intelligent enti-
ty must conjecture appro-
priate responses to failures
and try them out empirically.
A wide variety of learning
approaches and experimental
design methods can contribute to this
challenge.
The world model will need to address
a wide variety of facets and at the same
time incorporate a diverse set of model-
ing approaches. Bayesian networks, rule-
based systems and common sense
knowledge bases, static and dynamic
analyses, linear and differential equa-
tions, exact and statistical formulas, sym-
bolic and geometric models—all these
can all help solve different classes of
problems. In addition, intelligent beings
need models at different levels of
abstraction and aggregation to address
different kinds of prediction and control
problems.
Obviously, then, the world model
will comprise a large amount and vari-
ety of knowledge. As a consequence,
we should conceive the world model as
a collection of useful, partial views
applicable to particular questions. If we
want to catch a fly ball, for example,
we could use a neural net to learn para-
meters that control our motion, or we
could break the problem into one of
statistically predicting the intercept loca-
tion and determining change of position
objectives for achieving that intercept.
Similarly, each type of prediction and
control challenge can be approached in
diverse ways. We should favor architec-
tural and engineering approaches that
reinforce a diverse collection of knowl-
edge components. The intelligent entity
ought to consider each relevant knowl-
edge component in addressing its behav-
ioral objectives, trying to use it to plan
desired outcomes, and trying to rectify it
when it fails to generate valid expecta-
tions. Competence in diverse real-world
tasks will require a variety of representa-
tions, lots of knowledge expressed in
those forms, and continuous learning in
response to empirical results.
THE SINGULARITY, RUNAWAY
AGENTS, AND OTHER RISKS
Futurologists, science fiction writers,
and other visionaries often foresee
events before they occur. While no one
has an accurate crystal ball, many
visions do ultimately become reality.
Several long-range forecasts about what
AI could accomplish have turned out to
be true: We have champion game play-
ers, autonomous vehicles, mobile
robots, expert systems, speech tran-
scription systems, and so forth. In other
cases, practice has come up short, or
the visions themselves have turned out
to be absurd.
In the case of self-modifying and self-
improving AI, most of the visions have
been a bit scary or a bit shallow. Much
discussion has occurred around the con-
cept of “the singularity,” first explained
by Vernor Vinge, and now a popular
theme. Roughly, the singularity is a point
in history when technology accelerates
beyond human capacity to master it.
With regard to AI, this could mean
that computers are able to learn
and communicate with one
another faster than they can
with humans and, at that
point, they might not be
willing to slow down or
engage further. In
such a case, the
machines would





In this article, I’m
suggesting that we
should actively seek to
create the capabilities
underlying such a possibil-
ity, because the potential
gains are exponentially greater
than what traditional puppetry
can produce. But surely this also
entails risks, as readily suggested in
most of the scary movies about rogue
AI and robots gone haywire.
We obviously have only limited
insight into both the positive and nega-
tive capabilities of self-improving AI 
systems. Although the road will be some-
what long, we ought to consider ways to
identify and mitigate the risks before they
afflict us. Fortunately, many people inter-
ested in the singularity and future visions
of robots have given these issues serious
consideration. We will want to incorpo-
rate their ideas and related technologies
into the neo-creationism agenda. This
will help prevent predictable problems
and provide additional insurance against
the unforeseen.
While I consider these risks serious,
































Fig. 1  Efficient thought employs eight
key functions supported by a world
model.
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deferred a bit. To get out of the pup-
petry business will require a major shift
in investment, orientation, and technol-
ogy. By focusing mostly on the required
new capacities for model-based learn-
ing and improvement in operational
contexts, we put first things first.
THE R&D AGENDA
To empower agents that can contin-
uously improve their world knowledge,
we must do at least three things:
• create agents that tackle real-world
problems on a routine basis
• require the agents to justify their
actions by explaining why they expect
their behaviors to fulfill their goals and
objectives
• demand that the agents continual-
ly improve.
These three desired capabilities can
usefully drive the R&D agenda for the
next decade. Let’s consider each one
more thoroughly.
CHALLENGE 1: GET INTO THE GAME
The first challenge is to get the agents
into the game. The real world is full of
tasks that intelligent agents can perform,
and we need to put many agents to work.
Traditionally we would meet this imple-
mentation challenge in one of two ways.
• We could handcraft an expert sys-
tem or customize an off-the-shelf applica-
tion. In either case, we’d be relying on
humans to compile their understanding of
the task and the context into some rules
or procedures they’d embed in code.
• We could use an artificial neural net
or other learning program to produce
behaviors consistent with some training
cases. In this approach, the humans and
the machine learner would avoid the
challenge of building a generally useful
understanding of how things work.
Whatever world model knowledge might
justify and explain the solution would be
compiled out of the finished program.
In contrast with these “business as
usual” approaches, our second and third
challenges will require that the agents be
capable of understanding how things
work and how to employ that under-
standing to choose particular actions in
dynamic contexts. Thus, we probably
can’t address the second and third chal-
lenges without approaching the first chal-
lenge in a new way. We need to use
machines to generate behaviors from
models so that predicted outcomes meet
or exceed goals.
This means that general planning and
problem-solving approaches must be
applied routinely to generate agent
behaviors. However, most research to
date on planning has been applied to
extremely narrow tasks or artificial ones.
So the first challenge is to make planners
robust enough to employ flexible behav-
ior models in addition to rich, complex,
messy descriptions of realistic and
dynamic contexts.
Measures of progress against this R&D
challenge will include the four below:
M1.1) The same planner automatically
generates multiple effective agents.
M1.2) The more knowledge provided
about the operational context, the better
the generated behaviors.
M1.3) The more knowledge provided
about the operational capabilities avail-
able to the agent, the better the behav-
iors the planner generates.
M1.4) The planner increasingly adopts
and employs specialized plan abstrac-
tions and planning heuristics to achieve
superior results.
CHALLENGE 2: 
UNDERSTAND WHAT TO EXPECT
The second challenge is to get
agents to understand what effects they
should expect and why. There are two
basic ways humans and other intelligent
creatures learn.
First, when guided by reinforcement,
actors shape their behavior to get more
rewards. Even when agents don’t
understand what’s going on, this
method can work. Reinforcement learn-
ing works when the agent can vary its
behavior experimentally, notice which
experimental behaviors lead to greatest
rewards, and bias future behaviors
toward repeating those.
But we seek agents that can discover
more about cause and effect so they
can model the world and predict conse-
quences in a wide variety of circum-
stances. So, even when they are merely
responding to positive reinforcement,
we want our agents to test systematical-
ly hypotheses about what’s going on.
This means each agent should be using
models to explain to itself why events
are unfolding the way they are and to
anticipate what the likely consequences
of alternative actions would be. 
The second way humans learn today
is from failure, and many people report
such learning as emotionally charged,
difficult, and occasionally profound.
When we behave in a rational way, con-
sistent with experience, yet encounter
failure and punishment, we feel the sting
of rebuke and the humiliation of defeat.
We then move to the questions “How
could this occur?” and “How could this
be avoided?” At that moment, the spark
of insight and innovation often leaps out.
Usually, to answer those questions, we
must construct a conjecture, a possible
explanation or theory, about causality.
For example, “This could occur because
the customer for my product is a jerk” or
“The customer applied subjective criteria
to evaluate the product that I didn’t
understand.” With regard to avoiding
such failures, the conjectures might be, “I
can avoid this kind of problem by never
working with this customer or anybody
like him” or “We can avoid failures of this
sort by substituting objective criteria for
subjective assessments.” No matter what
the failure, the learning agent needs to
conjecture how to avoid it in the future.
This can be done merely by seeking to
avoid the punishing context, as animals
do, or by understanding what caused the
failure and then adopting better plans to
take those causes into account.
We could measure progress toward
this challenge by the following criteria:
M2.1) Agents can predict what
effects their actions will have and
explain why.
M2.2) Agents can explain why things
happen to them, especially good things
and bad things.
M2.3) Agents can construct plausible
new theories as needed to explain why
bad things happen.
M2.4) Agents can use plausible new




The third challenge is for agents to
improve themselves continually. Agents
that operate in realistic task environments
frequently fail to achieve desired results,
make mistakes that are punished, and
expend more resources than deemed
optimal. So the world can be a harsh
mentor for the agents. What we want are
agents that appreciate the challenge and
address it intelligently. What should they
do? Like smart scientists or executives,
the agents need to realize that “there’s no
haven from risk,” therefore they can’t
avoid failures. Instead, they need to
make the most of failures by learning
how to avoid them as much as possible.
Also, when they find a recipe that works,
they need to remember it, develop a the-
ory about why it works, and reapply the
theory and recipe as appropriate in
future circumstances.
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Challenge 3 requires that agents con-
tinually strive to formulate better and
better world models and exploit them.
To improve their world models, they
need to notice when a learning oppor-
tunity arises, develop their conjectures,
and formulate experiments to test and
validate these.
In addition, the third challenge
brings with it a requirement to auto-
mate experimental hypothesis testing.
Agents must consider alternative ways
to conduct experiments and then allo-
cate scarce resources to the tests that
predictably produce the greatest gains
per unit cost. This type of experimental
design is typical in domains such as
natural resource exploration and con-
sumer marketing. The general idea is
that when we have competing hypothe-
ses, each bit of data collected has some
probability of helping us rule out an
alternative. We seek designs that give
us the greatest reduction in uncertainty
per unit cost.
In short, we want agents to behave
like intelligent experimentalists, contin-
ually asking where is the “bang for the
buck” in reducing uncertainty about
their own models. The “bang” is an esti-
mate of the improved outcomes that
can result from better rewards or
reduced failures. The “buck” is the cost
of running an experiment, which might
mean explicitly testing whether a new
conjectured theory will avoid a previ-
ous stinging failure. With this final ele-
ment in hand, we can empathize with
the agents we’ll have created: at this
point, they reap the rewards of victory
and the agonies of defeat, just as
humans do.
Measures of progress against this
final challenge are:
M3.1) The agent can predict differen-
tial outcomes implied by alternative the-
ories.
M3.2) The agent can design efficient
experiments to reduce uncertainty
among alternative theories.
M3.3) The agent can estimate the
cost of conducting an experiment,
given its current world model.
M3.4) The agent can identify the best
bang-for-the-buck experiments to con-
duct to improve its expected results.
FUTURE WORK, 
PLAUSIBLE OUTCOMES
The R&D agenda suggested above
should lead the AI and robotics com-
munities into a very different future.
The component capabilities and combi-
nations that ensue will differ greatly
from those now mostly produced by
the puppet makers. In addition, the
intelligent agents that result will reflect
peculiarities of the operating environ-
ments and the task responsibilities that
shape them. Their world models and
physical interfaces will necessarily fit
that task environment.
Let’s consider just one example to
illustrate how this work will likely
unfold. Consider an artificial driver
for an autonomous land vehicle that
will be able to coexist with human
drivers in everyday traffic. While we
have many primitive autonomous
vehicles today, none has much under-
standing of the behavior of other
piloted vehicles and common sense
“rules of the road.” Each item in the
R&D agenda shows up quickly in the
following scenario for developing our
artificial driver. 
Step 1: Create agents that tackle
real-world problems on a routine
basis. Practically, it’s probably too dan-
gerous to put learning artificial drivers
into any community unless they are
accompanied by mentors with override
capability. So, there are two obvious
approaches:
1) employ such mentor instructors
2) put the learners in a safe learn-
ing environment, using either real or
simulated vehicles that can see, avoid,
and stop the learner from causing an
actual injury.
Military autonomous vehicles are
developed by both methods. Routine
civilian applications will require similar
investments wherever injuries must be
prevented. 
The vehicle should be given peri-
odic missions to accomplish, such as
running errands or performing inspec-
tion and surveillance tasks. The pilot
agent should seek and exploit avail-
able information sources for route
planning, should select specific routes
that have desirable properties, and
should set about navigating and con-
trolling. It should continually reassess
whether i ts information sources,
knowledge, logic, and processes
achieve desired outcomes, and do so
well. When it finds faulty expectations
or poor results, it will want to demon-
strate the second and third capabili-
ties, as we now consider.
Step 2: Require the agents to justi-
fy their actions by explaining why
they expect their behaviors to fulfill
their goals and objectives. 
Learning from failures provides the
biggest source of opportunity and
should be the first focus for research.
As an example, consider what the dri-
ver agent should do when it strikes a
vehicle that runs a red light or opens
a street-side door just as the vehicle
approaches. In each case, the agent
must formulate conjectures about
how to prevent the undesired out-
come. To do that, it must analyze the
rationales for the plans it had devel-
oped to see where they might have
gone wrong.
In the case of being struck by a red-
light-running car, the agent’s plan might
simply be “When my route takes me
across an intersection with a green
light, proceed across the intersection.”
The agent may have had other world
model elements leading to collisions,
but it apparently had none that applied
to this case. As a result, it could justify
its expectation of safe passage by
explaining that it observed a green
light, it followed its route, and it had no
basis for predicting a collision. 
Nevertheless, it needs now to con-
jecture plausible fixes. In other publica-
tions I have spelled out some construc-
tive procedures generating such conjec-
tures (see “Read More About It”). It’s
time to put these to work. One method
seeks to assure the negation of the
unhappy outcome. In this case, how
does the agent assure negation of a
collision? Because it can already navi-
gate with other moving entities, it must
have in its world model a capability to
predict future position on the basis of
position and velocity, but it apparently
doesn’t use that for vehicles on roads
at crossing intersections. One conjec-
tured fix then would be to dead reckon
the future positions of all vehicles,
regardless of traffic lights, and navigate
safely around them. In this case it
would add this method to its world
model, and other navigating rules
would assure it avoided collisions with
such forecast states. 
As another example, the agent could
examine its model of intersections,
including the notion that piloted vehi-
cles stop at red lights, a belief it already
presumably possesses because it stops
at red lights and knows that the same
laws govern all drivers. In this case, that
part of the world model generated a
false expectation, so the model itself is
surely wrong. The agent could try any
of several procedures to generate plau-
sible conjectures.
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One of these is that there is some-
thing special about the car that ran the
red light, and that special property
should be added as an exception.
Another is that the prediction became
inconsistent with another confirmed
prediction based on momentum-based
dead reckoning available 1 or 2 s
before the collision. That is, when the
other car approached the intersection, it
didn’t slow down, so part of the world
model would forecast that it would
enter the intersection at the same time
as the agent’s own vehicle, thereby pre-
dicting a collision. In this case, the
agent could conjecture such a short-
term momentum-based prediction. Or,
as an alternative, it could add the nega-
tion of that predicted state to the origi-
nal rule it was following, making a new
conjectured behavior rule: “When my
route takes me across an intersection
with a green light and there is no
momentum-predicted intersecting vehi-
cle, proceed across the intersection.”
Step 3: Demand that the agents
continually improve. To this point,
the example shows that the research
agenda leads us to create agents that
can generate expectations, justify them,
and; when necessary, critique them.
The car-driving agent has now presum-
ably constructed several conjectures
that might reasonably have avoided the
collision and hopefully would preclude
future collisions. The agent needs to
test these alternatives and elect to
employ one or more of them. 
How can this testing be done, in
practical ways? Possible ways are:
1) The agent can mentally simulate
scenarios with and without the candi-
date new knowledge, to see if the
change in world model changes the
expectation to avoid the collision.
2) The agent can try out one or
more of the conjectured new knowl-
edge elements in its task environment,
collecting evidence about each.
3) The agent can carry multiple
alternatives and adopt a metalevel risk-
management approach, so that it dri-
ves “defensively” while gathering evi-
dence about each of its possible world
model improvements. In this approach,
the agent adopts the most conservative
action implied by any of its beliefs,
while continuing to evaluate the validi-
ty of each. It can safely operate while
deprecating conjectures that don’t
work reliably.
This brief example shows how the
R&D agenda can take form when we
apply it to particular agents performing
meaningful tasks in realistic environ-
ments. As in most engineering fields,
the field of autonomous, continuously
improving agents will be shaped signifi-
cantly by the tasks actually undertaken.
Commercial investors and government
R&D agencies likely will have the great-
est influence on those choices. 
CONCLUSION
AI currently progresses at a slow
rate. We need to jump to an exponen-
tial rate of improvement. To cross that
chasm, we need to emphasize the
development of continuously self-
improving systems that interact with
and perform tasks in the physical
world. Creation of those systems will
mark a singularity in the punctuated
evolution of artificial intelligence.
Researchers in the next decade
should catalyze the transition toward
autonomy by emphasizing the use of
world models that enable agents to pre-
dict and explain outcomes. Three pri-
mary technical challenges shape the
R&D agenda, and researchers can mea-
sure contributions toward the collective
agenda, using any of the dozen metrics
suggested in the three steps of the
development scenario above.
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